



DEFENDANT'S REFUSAL TO ANSWER ELEVEN
QUESTIONS DESIGNED TO ASCERTAIN COMMUNIST
ASSOCIATIONS OF CO-CONSPIRATORS HELD
ELEVEN SEPARATE CONTEMPTS
At the trial of petitioner and co-defendants for conspiracy to violate
the Smith Act,' petitioner took the stand in her own defense. She volun-
tarily waived the privilege against self-incrimination, but while under cross-
examination refused to answer eleven different questions concerning her
association with the other defendants, on the ground that she would not be
an informer. In each instance the court instructed petitioner to answer
and, upon her refusal to do so, declared her in contempt. At conclusion
of the session, the court announced that it would treat each refusal as
a separate criminal contempt pursuant to rule 42(a) of the Federal Rules
of Criminal Procedure. Accordingly, petitioner was sentenced to one
year imprisonment for each of the eleven separate contempts, the sentences
to run concurrently.2 The court of appeals, in affirming, held that the
sentences indicated no abuse of discretion. Yates v. United States, 227
F.2d 851 (9th Cir. 1955), cert. granted, 350 U.S. 947 (1956).
The Judicial Code 3 and the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure 4
authorize federal courts to punish summarily by fine or imprisonment
contempts conunitted in their presence; both conviction and sentence are
subject to appellate review for abuse of discretion.5 When witnesses
have not answered a series of questions intended to elicit the same fact, the
courts have considered the refusals as one contempt." Thus, where a
1. 18 U.S.C. § 2385 (1952).
2. The contempt sentence, however, was not to commence until after petitioner's
release from custody following execution of the five-year sentence imposed upon her in
the main case, Yates v. United States, 225 F.2d 146 (9th Cir.), cert. granted, 350 U.S.
860 (1955).
3. 18 U.S.C. § 401 (1952) provides: "A court of the United States shall have
power to punish by fine or imprisonment, at its discretion, such contempt of its au-
thority, . . . as . . . (3) disobediance or resistance to its lawful writ, process,
order, rule, decree or command." 18 U.S.C. §402 (1952) provides that contempt
may be punished by fine, not exceeding $1,000, or by imprisonment, not exceeding six
months, or both, but expressly excepts contempt committed in the presence of the
court.
4. FED. R. Cana. P. 42(a) states: "A criminal contempt may be punished sum-
marily if the judge certifies that he saw or heard the conduct constituting the con-
tempt and that it was committed in the presence of the court. . . ."
5. Ex parte Terry, 128 U.S. 289, 313 (1888) ; Maclnnis v. United States, 191
F.2d 157, 162 (9th Cir. 1951); In re Maury, 205 Fed. 626 (9th Cir. 1913).
6. United States v. Orman, 207 F.2d 148, 160 (3rd Cir. 1953); United States v.
Emspak, 95 F. Supp. 1012 (D.D.C. 1950); United States v. Yuldo Abe, 95 F. Supp.
991, 992 (D. Hawaii 1951).
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cobgressional committee 7 held that two separate refusals by a witness to
give the name of a creditor constituted two contempts, the appellate court
reversed on the ground that'since both questions sought to establish but a
single fact, only one penalty for contempt could be imposed.8 Similarly,
refusal-to answer three separate inquiries as to whether defendant was a
Communist was reduced on review from three contempts to only one.9
The state cases treating this problem have reached the same result.'0  The
general principle was extended in United States v. Costello," ignored by
the instant court, where defendant refused to answer a number of unre-
lated questions after declaring that for reasons of health he would not give
further testimony that day. The Second Circuit held defendant guilty of
only one criminal contempt. In reaching its result the court stated, "But
when defendant made his position clear, the Committee could not multiply
the contempt, and the punishment, by continuing to ask him questions each
time eliciting the same answer: his refusal to give any further testimony." 12
The more subtle problem presented by the instant case is whether a court
may punish as separate contempts refusals to answer a series of analogous
questions designed to elicit a similar fact about different people. While it
might be argued that the questions asked in the instant case did not "..
seek to establish but a single fact, or relate to but a single subject of inquiry
. ... ,,113 the case does appear to fit within the Costello rule. Once peti-
tioner had made clear her refusal to be an "informer," 14 further questions
along the same lines could only receive the same answer.
While the court correctly found that the trial court was justified in
punishing petitioner for contempt,15 it does not appear from the opinion
that the court considered the implications of treating the refusals as
separate offenses. The court's result permits considerably larger punish-
ments than are usual in contempt cases. Although the power under the
federal statute to "punish for contempt committed in the presence of the
court is limited only by appellate review for abuse of discretion,' 6 the
7. R.v. STAT. § 102 (1875), 2 U.S.C. § 192 (1952) imposes a maximum sentence
of twelve months for refusal to answer any question relative to any subject under
investigation in a congressional committee. Cf. Lawson v. United States, 176 F.2d
49 (D.C. Cir. 1949).
8. United States v. Orman, 207 F.2d 148, 160 (3d Cir. 1953). The court held
it proper to put each refusal in a separate count but, as they concerned only one
subject of inquiry, the refusals were punishable as only one contempt.
9. United States v. Emspak, 95 F. Supp. 1012 (D.D.C. 1950).
10. Maxwell v. Rives, 11 Nev. 213 (1876) ; People ex rel. Amarante v. McDonnell,
100 N.Y.S.2d 463 (Sup. Ct. 1950) ; Fawick Airflex Co. v. United Electrical Workers,
87 Ohio App. 371, 92 N.E.2d 431 (1950).
11. 198 F.2d 200 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 344 U.S. 874 (1952).
12. Id. at 204.
13. United States v. Orman, 207 F.2d 148, 160 (3d Cir. 1953).
14. Instant case at 854-55.
15. The judgment of the lower court was affirmed on the rationale that, once a
witness waives the privilege against self-incrimination, he must answer any question
proper and material to the inquiry. While this theory justifies the punishment for
contempt, it cannot explain the punishment for multiple contempt.
16. Appellate courts have reversed for abuse of discretion on only a few occasions.
See cases cited in note 5 supra. The Supreme Court noted in Weems v. United States,
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district courts have in practice usually imposed a sentence of but three
months or less.' 7 In view of this practice, if a defendant were given
an eleven-year sentence for one contempt it would clearly be held an
abuse of discretion; however, if defendant were given eleven one-year
sentences for eleven separate contempts, as in the instant case, but with
the sentences to run consecutively, an appellate court could logically fail
to find abuse. The result of the instant case has even greater import where
there is a statutory limit to contempt punishment, for it might enable the
courts to circumvent maximums established by the legislatures. All but
three states have statutory maximums,' 8 and a one-year maximum has been
set for contempts committed before congressional committees.' 9 In addi-
tion to the chance that a witness might be subjected to an unreasonably high
punishment, there is a possibility that the threat of such punishment will
encourage witnesses who might willingly answer other questions to claim
fifth amendment immunity as to all.2 0  Much valuable testimony could
thereby be lost, as in the instant case where defendant was willing to
reveal many facts-although withholding some-about both herself and
some acquaintances. Finally, there is a danger that a clever interrogator,
through the design of his questions, could control the length of time a
recalcitrant witness would spend in jail. In view of these possibilities, it
would have been far more desirable had the instant court followed the rea-
soning of the Costello case and treated the eleven refusals as one contempt.
217 U.S. 349, 368 (1910), that the "cruel and unusual" punishment test of the eighth
amendment may be applicable to punishment which by its excessive length or severity
may be greatly disproportionate to the offense charged. However, it appears that on
only two other occasions has the Court found abuse of discretion in a contempt sentence.
See Sacher v. Association of the Bar, 347 U.S. 388 (1954) ; United States v. United
Mine Workers, 330 U.S. 258, 304 (1947).
17. E.g., United States v. Gates, 176 F.2d 78 (2d Cir. 1949) (defendant in a
Smith Act prosecution introduced an exhibit into evidence, but declined to state who
prepared the exhibit under his direction; the penalty imposed was only thirty days
in civil contempt); see Cooke v. United States, 267 U.S. 517 (1925); MacInnis v.
United States, 191 F.2d 157 (9th Cir. 1951) ; Tosh v. West Ky. Coal Co., 252 Fed. 44
(6th Cir. 1918); In re Stein, 7 F.2d 169 (N.D. Cal. 1925).
18. These are New Hampshire, Rhode Island and Vermont. Sixteen have maxi-
mums for contempt committed out of the presence of the court but none for contempt
in the presence of the court. Twenty-nine jurisdictions impose an overall limitation
on punishment by all courts on every kind of contempt, including contempt com-
mitted in the presence of the court. Nine of these states provide a maximum
imprisonment of six months; one has a maximum of three months; the rest have
a maximum of thirty days or less. Brief for Appellant, pp. 29-30, Yates v. United
States, 227 F.2d 851 (9th Cir. 1955).
19. See note 7 supra.
20. A witness invoking the fifth amendment is put under pressure to claim it as
early as possible in order to avoid the possibility that the court will find that he has
"waived" the privilege by answering prior questions. Rogers v. United States,
340 U.S. 367, 372-75 (1951), 37 VA. L. REv. 629. On the propriety of claiming the
privilege in such circumstances see HuARD, TnE Fmir A -ENDMExT-AN EvALuATIoN
NOTE, 42 GEo. L.J. 345 (1954); and Notes, 4 CATHOLIC U.L. REv. 51 (1954);
32 Nan. L. REv. 577 (1953).
Even if a witness successfully invokes the fifth amendment to avoid possibility
of heavy punishment where he is determined not to answer certain questions, he
may still face unpleasant consequences. See Loew's, Inc. v. Cole, 185 F.2d 641
(9th Cir. 1950), cert. denied, 340 U.S. 954 (1951). See also Notes, 101 U. PA. L.
REv. 1190 (1953); 39 MiN. L. Rev. 75 (1954).
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Labor Law-
WHEN NLRB DECLINES JURISDICTION OVER
LABOR DISPUTE STATE COURT CAN TAKE
JURISDICTION AND APPLY FEDERAL LAW
Defendant unions picketed plaintiff.and dissuaded customers of the
plaintiff-company from purchasing supplies in order to force plaintiff
to sign a closed shop contract. Previously the National Labor Relations
Board had refused jurisdiction to hold a representation election because
plaintiff's interstate business was insufficient to meet the NLRB's self-
imposed jurisdictional standards.' Plaintiff sued the unions in the state
court and gained an injunction and damages. 2 On appeal, the California
Supreme Court affirmed and held that, where the NLRB refuses jurisdic-
tion over a representation election between parties who are in interstate
commerce, the state court may assume jurisdiction and apply the Labor
Management Relations Act 3 to an issue of unfair labor practices between
the parties. Garnwn v. San Diego Building Trades Council, 291 P.2d 1
(Cal. 1955) (4-3).
The Supreme Court has held that, if the provisions of the LMRA
apply to a dispute, the states may not take jurisdiction of that issue.4 An
exception to this rule is found in section 10(a) of the LMRA 5 which
allows state jurisdiction in those situations in which the NLRB cedes
jurisdiction, case by case, to a state agency8 that enforces a law not
inconsistent with the federal act. Conduct neither protected nor prohibited
by the LMRA may also be controlled by the states, and a state may
prevent violence incident to a labor dispute.8 The scope of the LMRA
1. 19 NLRB ANN. REP. 2 (1954) sets forth the newest standards, promulgated in
1954. The discretionary taking of jurisdiction was upheld in NLRB v. Denver Bldg. &
Constr. Trades Council, 341 U.S. 675, 684 (1951) (dictum); Haleston Drug Stores,
Inc. v. NLRB, 187 F.2d 418 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 342 U.S. 815 (1951).
2. The employer contended successfully that if it signed the contract that the
union offered, it would be coercing its employees to join a union of which, at the
moment, none were members, and that such coercion was an unfair labor practice
on the part of the employer. Labor Management Relations Act, 61 STAT. 140
(1947), as amended, 29 U.S.C. § 158(a)(3) (1952).
3. 61 STAT. 136 (1947), as amended, 29 U.S.C. §§ 141-97 (1952).
4. Weber v. Anheuser-Busch, Inc., 348 U.S. 468 (1955); Building Trades
Council v. Kinard Constr. Co., 346 U.S. 933 (1954); Garner v. Teamsters Union,
AFL, 346 U.S. 485 (1953).
5. 61 STAT. 146 (1947), as amended, 29 U.S.C. § 160(2) (1952).
6. Only eleven states have labor boards. Lorenz, The Conflict of Jurisdiction,
2 LAn. L.J. 887, 894 (1951). In the instant case no ceding of jurisdiction could take
place since California has no labor agency. See instant case at 10 n.2.
7. International Union, United Automobile Workers, AFL v. Wisconsin Employ-
ment Relations Board, 336 U.S. 245 (1949).
8. Allen-Bradley Local 1111, United Electrical Workers v. Wisconsin Employ-
ment Relations Board, 315 U.S. 740 (1942).
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includes all labor disputes affecting interstate commerce,9 but ihe NLRB
has not seen fit, to exercist its full power,,for;-buclgetary:reasiris and:'hag
voluntarily limitedits jurisdiction.where the effect, of the parties pr inter-
state commerce .falls below, the -announced standards* 19 "The, -Supreme
Court has noted but not settled the question of who has jurisdiction when
the NLRB is empowered to act but declines to do so." Some state and
lower federal courts hold that only the NLRB can act in this field,12 while
others hold that once the NLRB declines jurisdiction the states may apply
their local law to the issue even though the parties are in interstate com-
merce. 13 The instant case permits state jurisdiction but is novel in that
it applies the LMRA and not the pertinent state law.' 4
The area between the theoretical limits of NLRB jurisdiction and its
self-imposed jurisdictional standards may be considered a "no-man's
land," 15 for, if the doctrine of federal preemption controls, and the Board
refuses to act, the state courts cannot grant relief, and the wrong, if any,
will remain unremedied." This would frustrate the national labor policy
which has set standards to establish and maintain peace in labor relations,
and would allow the parties to use methods deemed unfair labor practices
by the LMRA. One solution tothis problem would be to increase the size 16
and budget of the NLRB to enable it to meet its potential workload and
thus be able to employ its expertise and specialized procedure in all labor
9. For a discussion of the scope of the LMRA, see Cox, Federalism in the Law
of Labor Relations, 67 HARv. L. REV. 1297, 1345-48 (1954); Lorenz, The Conflict
of Jurisdiction, 2 LAB. L.J. 887 (1951); Ratner, Problems of Federal-State Juris-
diction in Labor Relations, 3 LAB. L.J. 750, 766, 815 (1952).
10. The 1954 standard .makes direct sales affecting commerce over $50,000,
indirect sales affecting commerce over $100,000 or $200,000 depending on directness
of utilization, direct purchases affecting commerce of $500,000 and indirect pur-
chases of $1,000,000 sufficient to call forth NLRB jurisdiction. 19 NLRB AxrN. RaP.
2-3 (1954).
11. Building Trades Council v. Kinard Constr. Co., 346 U.S. 933 (1954),
reversing per curiam 258 Ala. 500, 64 So. 2d 400 (1953).
12. Cooper Transport Co. v. Stufflebeam, 28 CCH Lab. Cas. 169,364 (Mo. 1955);
Cooper Transport Co. v. Stuffiebeam, 26 CCH Lab. Cas. ff 68,488 (Mo. 1954) ; Richman
Bros. Co. v. Amalgamated Clothing Workers, 28 CCH Lab. Cas. ff69,320 (C.P.
Ohio 1955).
13. Your Food Stores v. Retail Clerks' Local 1564, AFL, 124 F. Supp. 697
(D.N.M. 1954), rev'd, 225 F.2d 659 (10th Cir. 1955); Hammer v. Local 211, United
Textile Workers, AFL, 34 N.J. Super. 34, 111 A.2d 308 (Ch. 1954); see Caneer v.
Retail Clerks Int'l Ass'n, 17 CCH Lab. Cas. 165,582 (Super. Ct. Cal. 1950).
14. For an interesting point on whether the NLRB must actually refuse jurisdic-
tion in each case before the court may take jurisdiction, see Cain, Brogden & Cain,
Inc. v. Local 47, International Brotherhood of Teamsters, 285 S.W.2d 942, 950 (Tex.
1956), which holds that an informal refusal to take jurisdiction by the NLRB is
sufficient to give the state court jurisdiction. The instant case at 4 and 11-12 (dissent-
ing opinion) discusses the point.
15. For a discussion of the "no-man's land" see Feldblum, Jurisdictional "Tide-
lands" in Labor Relations, 3 LAB. L.J. 114 (1952); Hays, Federalisn and Labor
Relations in the United States, 102 U. PA. L. Rav, 959, 976-77 (1954); Note, 53
CoLlns. L. Rav. 258, 269-71 (1953).
16. A possible drawback to this proposal is that an increase in the size of the
NLRB might lead to a rigidity in applying new policies or a slowdown in the de-
cisional process. See Cox, supra note 9, at 1339-40.
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pr6blkns affecting corimerce. However, the present policy of the NLRB
ig rather to limit further its scope Of jhrisdiction and-decrease its ex-
pehditures:17 A second solution is to permit the state courts to takd'juris-
-diction ver the disputes ini the "'no-man's land" hiatus. Although the
deterxiiination tba~f the states may so take jurisdicti6n is subject to debate,18
for the purpos~s of this discussion it is assumied that jurisdiction of a itate
agency in this "'no-man's land" is permitted.
Given jurisdiction, the question arises whether the state court 'or
administrative board should apply state or federal law.19 The solution of
this problem may be crucial in many cases uch as the instant one where
the unions' dctivity was legal under state law and illegal under federal
law." If state labor law ii applied, the' result is a loss of uniform national
labbr policy to the extent that state laws vary from the LMRA.21 More-
over, since the 6xercise of jurisdiction by the NLRB is discretionary and
occasionally the Board takes jurisdiction in cases falling below its an-
nounced standards,2 there 'may be some confusion among the parties
whether state or federal law will be applicable. Another pbtefitial result
of the application of state law may be state competition for smaller in-
dustries, which fall below the NLRB's standards, by enactment of anti-
union legislation.P On the other hand, if the federal LMRA is applied,
the above difficulties are largely obviated; the one tandard thought by
Congress most likely to insure industrial peac6 will be applied uniforily to
all parties affecting interstate trade. Yet, state court or state b'oard eft-
17. See Daykin, NLRB Jurisdictional Standards: II, 6 LAB. L.J. 696 (1955).
In the fiscal year ending June 30, 1953, the NLRB expended 8.9 million dollars and
closed 15,818 cases. 18 NLRB ANN. REP. 9, 93 (1953). This was under the 1950
standard. For a comparison of the 1950 and 1954 standards, see Sullivan, "Affecting
Interstate Commerce": Coverage of National Labor Relations Act, U. ILL. L. FoRUm
191, .195-208 (1955>.;- In, th .fiscal year ending; 'June. 30,..1954, while., still operating
under the 1950 standard, th' LRB' spent 8.78 million'dollars and closed 13,989 cases
19 NLRB ANN. RAPt 8, 155 (1954). The-'1954 sindard vhich requires -a larger
interstate business than the 1950 standard cane into operation witlL the start of the
1954-55 fiscal year.
18. See note 9 supra. ; , ."
19. In the instant case, the court characterized its application of federal law as
required by state law and policy. Normally, state courts enforce federal statutes only
when Congress expressly provides for state enforcement See, e.g., Federal Employers'
Liability Act, 36 STAT. 291 (1910), as amended, 45 U.S.C. §56 (1952); Fair Labor
Standards Act, 52 STAT. 1069 (1938), as amended, 29 U.S.C. §216(b) (1952) ; Emer-
gency Price Control Act, 56 STAT. 33 (1942), as amended, 50 U.S.C. App. §925(c)
(1946). The LMRA contains no such provision and only permits state enforcement
when the NLRB cedes jurisdiction. See note 5 supra.
20. See instant case at 6-7.
21. The differences between the LMRA and state laws are readily apparent by
comparing the following state laws with § 8 of the LMRA: N.Y. LAB. LAw § 704;
PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 43, § 211.6 (Purdon 1952) ; S.C. CODE §§ 40-46 to -46.11 (Supp.
1955) ; UTAH CODE ANN. § 34-1-8 (1953).
22. E.g., Westport Moving'and Storage Co., 26 L.R.R.M. 1581 (NLRB 1950).
23. See Cox, supra note 9, at 1303. Recently, much anti-union legislation has
taken the form of right-to-work statutes. Kuhlman, Right-to-Work Laws: The
Virginia Experience, 6 LAB. L.J. 453 (1955). See Crook, Recent Developments in the
Nbrth-South Wage Differential, 6 IND. & LAB. RnL. REv. 67 (1952), which describes
the southern movement of the textile industry.
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forcement of the LMRA raises certain problems. First, most states do not
have special agencies to deal with labor problems 24 and their courts do
not have the expertise in deciding labor practice questions found in the
NLRB. Unlike the federal courts which always have a NLRB ruling
on an unfair practice before them, state courts will have to make the
initial determination without the guidance of the Board except insofar as
the Board's views can be ascertained from its prior decisions. Further-
more, state courts do not possess NLRB procedures to make rules and
regulations 2 5 Perhaps the most serious problem raised by a state tribunal
enforcing federal law is the lack of procedures to effectuate the certification
process which is a primary requisite of much union activity under the
LMRA.2 6 As a result, in this hiatus area it is impossible to give complete
effect to federal law. Insofar as gaining recognition is concerned, unions
must resort to economic pressure or alternate state processes if any are
available. There arises then the further question of the legality of cer-
tain union demands, e.g., the union shop, which would be an unfair labor
practice under the LMRA if the union were not certified 7 This might
be overcome if the state tribunal would waive the requirement of certifi-
cation where it is impossible to obtain. But this is merely an example of
the interpolation necessary in order to reconcile the substantive law of the
LMRA with the available procedures in the state attempting to administer
the federal statute. The end result may be many different adjustments of
the LMRA by state courts, thus defeating the major reason for invoking
federal law: uniformity among all the states.
Nuisance-
DEFENDANT'S INTENTIONAL ATTRACTION TO HIS
LAND OF WILD GEESE THAT DESTROYED
PLAINTIFF'S CROPS SUPPORTS ACTION
FOR PRIVATE NUISANCE
Plaintiff owns his farm from which he makes his living.' Defendant,
an adjoining landowner, built a pond on his land about 400 feet from their
common boundary; the pond is of little actual value to the defendant.
24. See note 6 supra.
25. 61 STAT. 140 (1947), 29 U.S.C. § 156 (1952).
26. 61 STAT. 143 (1947), as amended, 29 U.S.C. § 159 (1952).
27. A union may seek a contract provision requiring the firing of employees who
do not become members on or after the thirtieth day following the start of employ-
ment ". . . (i) if such labor organization is the representative of the employees as
provided in section 9(a) of this title. . . ." 61 STAT. 140 (1947), as amended,
29 U.S.C. § 158(a) (3) (1952). Section 9(a) provides for representation elections.
See note 26 supra.
1. Since the instant case was decided on demurrer, the facts alleged by the plain-
tiff were taken as true and will be so treated in this Comment.
RECENT CASES
Defendant placed lame wild geese, food and bait on and around the pond
in order to attract wild geese to it. He was successful in this endeavor,
for increasingly large numbers of wild geese were attracted to winter on
the pond.2 In their foraging these geese destroyed plaintiff's crops.3
Defendant knew, or should have known, that the natural consequence of
attracting the geese to his pond would be the destruction of plaintiff's crops.
Plaintiff claimed that the pond, lame wild geese and bait thereon constituted
a nuisance, for which he sought damages and injunctive relief. The su-
perior court sustained defendant's demurrer to the sufficiency of the com-
plaint, but the Supreme Court of North Carolina reversed, holding that
the complaint stated a cause of action for private nuisance. Andrews v.
Andrews, 88 S.E.2d 88 (N.C. 1955). 4
Private nuisance, a field of tort liability, arises out of an unreasonable
interference with another's interest in the use of his own land.5 It is based
on the doctrine that ond should so use his own property as not to injure
that of another.6 A cause of action for private nuisance is made out when
the following is shown: 7 that the plaintiff had a property right in respect
to the use interfered with; that the invasion was substantial; that the inva-
sion was intentional 8 and unreasonable; and that the defendant's conduct
was a substantial factor in bringing about the injury complained of.9
Almost all of these elements clearly indicate a cause of action in the instant
case. Destruction of crops has been held to be a sufficient invasion to
create liability for a private nuisance."" Since the defendant created the
pond with the knowledge that harm to the plaintiff's land was substan-
tially certain to result, and continued it with the knowledge that harm was
2. It is alleged that from Oct. 1951 to June 1952 there were approximately 200
geese on the pond and that the damage to plaintiff's crops for that period was $48;
that from Oct. 1952 to June 1953 there were approximately 1,200 geese on the pond
and that the damage for that period was $105; and that from Oct. 1953 to June 1954
there were approximately 3,000 geese on the pond and that the damage for that
period was $1,343.30. Instant case at 89-90.
3. The plaintiff's crops had never been molested previously by wild geese. In-
stant case at 89.
4. In a subsequent trial on the merits, plaintiff secured a judgment against the
defendant and a permanent injunction to abate the nuisance. Letter from M. C.
McLeod, attorney for plaintiff, to the University of Pennsylvania Law Review, Nov.
18, 1955, on file in Biddle Law Library, University of Pennsylvania Law School.
5. PaossER, TORTS § 72 (2d ed. 1955); 4 RESTATFMENT, ToRTs 220 (1939).
6. Morgan v. High Penn Oil Co., 238 N.C. 185, 193, 77 S.E.2d 682, 689 (1953)
and cases cited therein.
7. 4 RESTATEMENT, TORTS § 822 (1939). A jury charge based on these factors
was upheld in Soukoup v. Republic Steel Corp., 78 Ohio App. 87, 103-06, 66 N.E.2d
334, 341-43 (1946).
8. The conduct which gives rise to a private nuisance may be intentional, neg-
ligent or ultrahazardous. PROSSER, TORTS 392 (2d ed. 1955); 4 RESTATFmENT, TORTS
§ 822(d) (1939).
9. 4 RESTATEMENT, TORTS § 822(c) (1939); 2 id. §431; see Connellan v.
Coffey, 122 Conn. 136, 139, 142, 187 Atl. 901, 902, 904 (1936) ; Chase v. Washington
Water Power Co., 62 Idaho 298, 305, 111 P.2d 872, 875 (1941).
10. United Verde Extension Mining Co. v. Ralston, 37 Ariz. 554, 296 Pac.
262 (1931) (crops damaged by sulphurous smoke).
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iesulting, his conduct was intentional.." His conduct also was unreasoih-
able; as determined by weighing its utility against the harm to the plain-
tiff. 2
It is on the final factor, whether or not the defendant's acts can be
said to have been the proximate cause of plaintiff's injury, that difficulty
may arise. Arguably, the injury was caused by the wild geese, so the
defendant would be absolved on the ground that a superseding cause
insulates him from liability.1'3 -However, according to one line of authority
the intervening act of a human being 'or an animal which is a normal re-
sp6nse to the situation created by the defendant is not such a superseding
cause. 14 " Thus, it has been held that potential customers of a cafeteria
who formed lines on a sidewalk at mealtimes, thereby obstructing the
entrance to plaintiff's store, constituted an enjoinable nuisance for which
the restaurant owner was liable in damages.' 5 Likewise, the Supreme
Court of North Carolina held a defendant liable for negligently creating a
situation in which mosquitoes could breed, thereby being the proximate
cause of the plaintiff's contracting malaria.'6
On the' other hand, there is the doctrine illustrated by Sickman v.
United States that'one who neither owns, controls nor harbors an animal
ferae naturae is not responsible for an injury done by it. In that case
the Seventh Circuit held, on facts almost identical to the instant case, that
the United States could not be held liable undier the Federal Tort Claims
Act 17 for the trespasses of animals which are ferae 'naturae and which
exist in a state of nature.'8 It said that there was no ownership, control
or possession of the wild geese there involved which could impose liability
for their trespasses.' 9 This broad statement of the test to be applied in
determining liability for injury done by animals appears to be, an over-
statement of the law in this area. While a few cases hold that one who
11. Morgan v. High Peim Oil'Co., 238 N.C. 185, 194, 77 S.E.2d 682, 689 (1953);
PRossml, ToRTs 392 (2d ed. 1955) ; 4 RESTATmiENT, TORTS § 825 (1939).
12. See PRossER, TORTS 410-16 (2d ed. 1955) ; 4 RESTATEmENT, ToRTs' §§ 826-28,
830 (1939).
13. Superior Oil Co. v. Richmond, 172 Miss. 407, 420, 159 So. 850, 852 (1935)
(dictum); 2 RESTATEmIT, TORTS § 440 (1939).
14. 2 RESTATEMENT, TORTS § 443 (1939); Chicago, M., St. P. & Pac. Ry.
v. Goldhammex-, 79 F.2d 272, 274 (8th Cir. 1935), cert. denied, 296 U.S. 655 (1936)
(dictum); Loftin v. McC'rainie, 47 So. 2d 298, 301-02 (Fla. 1950) (dictum).
15. Shamhirt v. Morrison Cafeteria Co., 159 Fla. 629, 32 So. 2d 727 (1947),
aff'd, 160 Fla. 540, 35 So. 2d 842 (1948), 1 ALA. L. REv. 67; Tushbant v. Green-
field's, Inc., 308 Mich. 626, 14 N.W.2d 520 (1944) (injunction granted as modified).
16. Godfrey v. Western Carolina Power Co., 190 N.C. 24, 128 S.E. 485 (1925);
see Towaliga Falls Power Co. v. Sims, 6 Ga. App. 749, 65 S.E. 844 (1909).
17. 28 U.S.C. § 2680(a) (1952).
18. 184 F2d 616 (7th Cir. 1950), cert. denied, 341 U.S. 939 (1951). Wild geese
wintering on a game preserve maintained by the United States were the cause of the
damage to the plaintiffs' crops. Plaintiffs sued for damages on, among other things, a
private nuisance theory. In a dual holding, the court held for the United States both
on the merits and on the jurisdictional question under the Federal Tort Claims Act,
28 U.S.C. §2680(a) (1952).
19. 184 F.2d at 618.
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neither owns, controls or harbors an animal is not liable for any injury
done by it,20 others disregard this test and utilize usual tort principles.2 '
All of the results of the cases which purport to use the test may be explained
on other tort principles. For example, the court which .finds that the
defendant neither owned, controlled nor possessed an animal could .also
have found that there was no connection between any act or omission of
the defendant and the injury done by the animal. Moreover, no case
has been found, except for Sickmnn, using the test in a situation at all
analogous to the instant one.22 Even assuming the validity of the test, it
is arguable that one who places wild geese, food and bait on a pond in
order to attract wild geese to it has sufficient "control" over these animals
to subject him to liability for their depredations.2 It may further be noted
that the application of a private nuisance theory in Sicknwn might result
in non-liability, for a court could hold that the utility of the United States'
maintaining a bird preserve outweighed the harm to the plaintiff and,
therefore, was reasonable. But if the Sickman case cannot be distinguished
and if it correctly states the law of liability for the trespasses of animals,
then apparently the result in situations such as the instant case will turn
on which doctrine is applied.24 If this be so, then it is suggested that the
"animal doctrine" be overruled, for it is at best a little used anachronism.
Venue-
CONSCIENTIOUS OBJECTOR FAILING TO REPORT FOR
CIVILIAN WORK PROPERLY TRIED WHERE
DRAFT BOARD LOCATED
Defendant, a resident of Oklahoma, was classified as a conscientious
objector by his local draft board and ordered to report for civilian hospital
work in Kansas. He communicated to the board his refusal to comply
20. E.g., Hunt v. Hazen, 197 Ore. 637, 254 P.2d 210 (1953); Markwood v.
McBroom, 110 Wash. 208, 211, 188 Pac. 521, 522 (1920);. see White v. Lewis,
213 Miss. 686, 57 So. 2d 497 (1952) .(court refused to grant an injunction against
persons who neither owned nor controlled the offending animals). For a discussion
of the conflicting English decisions on this point, see Comment, 34 N.C.L. REv. 149,
151-53 (1955) (commenting on instant case).
21. E.g., a store owner who neither owns, keeps or possesses an animal may be
held liable for injury done by it on the theory of a breach of his common-law duty
to keep his premises safe for his customers. Andrews v. Jordan Marsh Co., 283
Mass. 158, 161, 186 N.E. 71, 72 (1933), see also Wilson v. Norumbega Park Co.,
275 Mass. 422, 176 N.E. 514 (1931) (amusement park); Cruickshank v. Brockton
Agricultural Soc'y, 260 Mass. 283, 157 N.E. 357 (1927) (fair exhibition); Westcott v.
Seattle-R. & S. Ry., 41 Wash. 618, 84 Pac. 588 (1906) (carrier).
22. Cf. cases cited in note 20 .npra.
23. See Crawford v. Kansas City Stock Yards Co., 228 Mo. App. 673, 677-78,
73 S.W.2d 308, 311 (1934).
24. The dissent in the instant case relied entirely upon Sickinan in stating that
defendant was not liable. The majority'opinion made no mention of Sickinan iii
reaching its decision.
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with the order and never entered Kansas where he was subsequently
indicted for violation of the Universal Military Training and Service
Act.1  The federal district court dismissed the indictment for lack
of proper venue on the ground that the offense was not committed
in Kansas 2 The Tenth Circuit affirmed, holding that for venue purposes
the district of the draft board should be considered the place of the offense
and trial. United States v. Patteson, 229 F.2d 257 (10th Cir.), ree'd, 351
U.S. 215 (1956).2a
Venue designates the particular district in which a court having juris-
diction may properly hear and determine the case.3 The Federal Con-
stitution requires that trial for a federal criminal offense be brought in the
state where the crime was committed.4 This venue provision, engendered
by eighteenth century colonial abuses, was intended to protect defendants
from the prejudice of trial at a place far from friends and witnesses. 5 Its
guarantee is implemented further by the Federal Rules of Criminal Pro-
cedure which provide: ". . . the prosecution shall be had in a district
in which the offense was committed. .. ."6 However, the strict letter
of these provisions does not clearly indicate the proper place of trial when a
defendant so acts in one district that he fails to fulfill a duty owed to fed-
eral authorities in another district. This is because the constitutional and
statutory specifications are geographic in nature,7 and the failure to act is
a status which cannot be located in geographical terms. This problem first
was presented in several cases in which the omission was failure to file
a report required by law. The Supreme Court held that venue was prop-
erly laid in the district where the office to which the report was due was
located.8 Subsequently, lower federal courts applied this rule to cases
arising under the selective service acts. In several cases defendants who
failed to report to their draft boards were held properly tried in the dis-
1. 62 STAT. 604 (1948), as amended, 50 U.S.C. App. §§451-73 (1952).
2. United States v. Patteson, 132 F. Supp. 67 (D. Kan. 1955).
2a. In subsequently reversing, the Supreme Court held that the duty which the
defendant failed to perform was to report for employment. "Accordingly venue must
lie where the failure occurred." 351 U.S. at 222. Chief Justice Warren and Justices
Black and Douglas dissented. Finding the issue to be one of statutory interpretation,
the dissenters'looked to the spirit of article III and the sixth amendment of the Con-
stitution and concluded that "any doubt should be resolved in favor of the citizen."
351 U.S. at 224.
3. See In re Robertson, 127 F. Supp. 39, 40 (W.D. Mo. 1954) ; Paige v. Sinclair,
237 Mass. 482, 484, 130 N.E. 177, 179 (1921); Southern Sand & Gravel Co. v.
Massaponax Sand & Gravel Corp., 145 Va. 317, 322, 133 S.E. 812, 813 (1926).
4. U.S. CoxsT. art. III, § 2, cl. 3.
5. Blume, The Place of Trial of Criminal Cases: Constitutional Vicinage and
Venue, 43 MICH. L. Rnv. 59, 63-66 (1944) ; Conner, The Constitutional Right to a
Trial by a Jury of the Vicinage, 57 U. PA. L. REv. 197, 208 (1909). The discussions
are directed at the vicinage requirement, U.S. CoNsT. amend. VI, but the same evils
must also have inspired the venue provision.
6. FED. R. Camr. P. 18.
7. See United States v. Anderson, 328 U.S. 699, 704-05 (1946).
8. Rumely v. McCarthy, 250 U.S. 283 (1919); United States v. Lombardo, 241
U.S. 73 (1916). For a later circuit court case, see United States v. Commerford,
64 F.2d 28 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 289 U.S. 759 (1933).
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tricts in which the boards were located although they lived elsewhere. 9
On facts nearly identical to those of the instant case, the Third Circuit
has held that the crime was committed at the place to which the defendant
failed to report.' 0 The Tenth Circuit expressly rejected this view in the
instant case."
In the factual situation of the instant case the offense probably is
sufficiently connected with both districts that Congress constitutionally
could choose either of them as the place of the offense for purposes of
venue.'2 Therefore, the issue presented is whether the purpose of the
federal criminal venue requirements is better effectuated if trial is held in
the district from which defendant refused to proceed or in the district to
which defendant failed to report. The problem is important because con-
scientious objectors are almost always assigned to civilian work outside of
their home communities and may be assigned to a distant state or ter-
ritory.13 Practically, the operation of the Third Circuit rule is subject to
substantial objections. First, the Government must pay for transporting
a clerk from the draft board with the records, and if the defendant fails
to post bond, the Government will bear the expense of transporting him
and the marshal having custody of him. Second, the defendant indicted
in the district to which he is ordered to report is subjected to great hard-
ship or prejudice. He must incur the expense of bringing character wit-
nesses there for trial or forego the advantage of their testimony. Loss of
time from his employment will increase the financial burden, and if he
posts bond he must pay his own travelling expenses to the place of trial.
Finally, the impecunious defendant faces the prospect of a criminal trial
in a strange place without the psychological support of the presence of
family or friends.laa
9. Jones v. Pescor, 169 F.2d 853 (8th Cir. 1948); Humes v. Pescor, 148 F.2d
127 (8th Cir. 1945) ; United States v. Van Den Berg, 139 F.2d 654 (7th Cir. 1944).
10. United States v. Johnston, 227 F.2d 745 (3d Cir. 1955), aff'd, 351 U.S. 215
(1956).
11. 229 F.2d at 259. The selective service statute imposes criminal penalties
on anyone who "... knowingly fails, neglects, or refuses to obey an order of his
local board. . . " 62 STAT. 609, 622 (1948), as amended, 50 U.S.C. App. §§ 456(j),
462(a) (1952). The Third Circuit opinion emphasized the defendant's failure to
report, while the Tenth Circuit seemed to stress the defendant's refusal to report,
but in each case the defendant's course of conduct was the same. A reading of the
statute which permits the decision to turn on such a difference would have the
improper result of allowing the wording of the indictment to control venue.
12. See text following notes 6 and 7 supra. In other situations federal law permits
venue in more than one district. See United States v. Commerford, 64 F.2d 28
(2d Cir.), cert. denied, 289 U.S. 759 (1933) ; 18 U.S.C. § 3237 (1952). Similarly, in
certain situations arising under state law venue may be proper in more than one
county. See ALT CODE OF CRIMINAL PROCEDURE §§ 241, 243, 244, Z45 (1930).
13. 32 C.F.R. §§ 1660.1(a) (1), 1660.21(a) (1954). As of January 20, 1955,
there were over 1400 approved agencies located in the forty-eight states, in United
States territories, and in foreign countries. NATIONAL SERvIcE BOARD FOR RELIGIOUS
OBJECTORS, AGENCIES AND INSTITUTIONS APPROVED FOR THE EMPLOYMENT OF CON-
SCIENTIOUS OBJECTORS IN CIVILIAN WORK OF NATIONAL HEALTH, SAFETY, OR
INTEREST (1955).
13a. In reversing the instant case, the Supreme Court stated that "no showing of
any arbitrary action appears [in this case]. . . ." 351 U.S. at 220. From this it may
be inferred that an unreasonable selection of the place of assignment by the selective
service board might not be effective to refuse venue at the place of reporting.
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These handicaps may be especially significant in the case where a
defendant is seeking judicial review of the administrative treatment of his
case. By Supreme Court decision, the impropriety of selective service
proceedings may be raised as a defense to criminal prosecution under the
act only when defendant has exhausted his administrative remedies. 14 With
respect to conscientious objectors assigned to civilian work, exhaustion
seems to require that a registrant who has received notice of his work
assignment report to the board, as directed, for final travel instructions
and then refuse to proceed. 15 But the Third Circuit rule, which places the
trial of th defendant in the district to which he was to report, forces
a defendant, who may be protesting a prior administrative breach of the
classification process, to seek judicial review wherever the board cliooses
to order him, although from an exhaustion of remedies point of view he
would seem to qualify for trial in the district of his board. Inasmuch as his
evidence probably is local, the defendant may be impeded in securing effec-
tive judicial review.
The Tenth Circuit rule would have obviated these difficulties while not
unduly inconveniencing the prosecution. Evidence probative of the facts
that defendant lawfully was ordered to report for duty and was notified of
the order is located in thedistrict of the board. The only witness which the
Government may have to transport to trial is the person who will introduce
the civilian agency's report of defendant's failure to appear for duty.
But often such a witness is unnecessary since .this fact is reflected in de-
fendant's file and is usually stipulated by his counsel.16
14. Estep v. United States, 327 U.S. '114 (1946);* Falbo v. United States,
320 U.S. 549 (1944). Though both of these cases arose under the Selective Training
and Service Act of 1940, c. 720, 54 STAT. 885, legislative history of the penalties
section, 12(a), indicates that their interpretation of exhaustion of administrative
remedies was to apply to" the 1948 act, 62 STAT. 622, 50 U.S.C. App. §462(a)
(1952) ; S. REP. No. 1268, 80th Cong., 2d Sess. 20 (1948). This section has not been
amended since then.
15. Prior to 1948 a conscientious objector opposed to noncombatant military
service was assigned to a civilian public service camp, and since he might be
rejected after a physical examination at the camp, he was required to report there
before he was considered to have exhausted his administrative remedies. See note 14
supra. When a change in the regulations eliminated examinations at the camps,
a conscientious objector was no longer required to report to camp in order to
complete the administrative process and contest his classification in the courts.
Dodez v. United States, 329 U.S. 338 (1946). The civilian public service camps
no longer exist, and conscientious objectors opposed to noncombatant duty are as-
signed to work of national importance in civilian agencies. 65 STAT. 86 (1951), 50
U.S.C. App. § 456(j) (Supp. 1955); see note 13 supra. Physical examinations are
conducted prior to the order to report for work, and a conscientious objector would
appear to have exhausted the administrative process when he reports to the board
and receives his work orders. United States v. Sutter, 127 F. Supp. 109, 117 (S.D. Cal.
1954).
.16. Letter from Hayden C.- Covington, Esq., to the University of Pennsylvania
Law Review, April18, 1956, on.file in Biddle Law Library, University of Pennsyl-
vania Law School. In the situation where a conscientious objector fails to report
to his board which is in a district other than that in which he is now living, the
Tenth Circuit rule would seem to conflict with existing doctrine which lays venue
in the district where the board is located. See note 9 supra and accompanying text.
Since trial in this district would seem to involve the same hardship to the defendant
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Clearly, the orderly administration of the criminal provisions of the
draft laws requires a general test for determining venue, rather than an
ad hoc policy determination in each case. In light of venue policy the
Tenth Circuit reached a result preferable to that of the Third Circuit rule
selected by the Supreme Court. Apparently, there is no general rule which
can solve the problem of venue in cases involving various kinds of criminal
omissions as the Third Circuit appeared to assume. Rather, the fact situa-
tion generally obtaining in any particular type of criminal omission must
be considered in light of the purposes of the venue requirements before a
proper rule for each type of omission can be formulated.
Zoning-
PENNSYLVANIA PERMITS ERECTION OF BUILDING
ON LAND PREVIOUSLY DEVOTED
TO A NONCONFORMING USE
Appellant operated a welding and automobile repair business in the
garage at the rear of his property. He also used in his business a portion
of this lot adjacent to the garage. In 1951 a zoning ordinance was enacted
classifying as residential the area in which appellant's property was
located. His business, therefore, became a nonconforming use. Two
years later he applied for a permit to construct an addition to his garage
to enclose the area of his lot already used in his business. The board of
adjustment refused the permit and the court of common pleas affirmed.'
On appeal the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania reversed, holding that under
article V, section 1(a) of the ordinance, which permits the continuation of
existing nonconforming uses of land, the appellant had the right to enclose
with a building the portion of his lot used in his business at the time of the
adoption of the ordinance. Peirce Appeal, 384 Pa. 100, 119 A.2d 506
(1956).
The zoning ordinance 2 provides in article III, section 2(2) that
henceforth no land shall be used or building erected except in conformity
as does the Third Circuit rule in the instant situation, the Tenth Circuit, in order to
be consistent, apparently would have to place venue in the district in which the
defendant lived. This result does not necessarily follow because the defendant prob-
ably once resided in the district where he registered and he may have friends and
character witnesses available there. Moreover, since such a defendant himself deter-
mines his distance from the district of his draft board, it is reasonable to give greater
weight to the convenience of the Government
1. Opinion filed in Common Pleas Court of Beaver County, Pa., by P.J. Robert
E. McCreary, Feb. 21, 1955.
2. The relevant sections of the zoning ordinance provide:
". .. Article III, Section 2(2) . . . Hereafter no land shall be used or
occupied, and no building or structure shall be erected, altered, used or occupied
1956]
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with the ordinance. Article V contains an exemption from this provision:
section l(a) permits the continuation of an existing nonconforming use
of land, and section 1(b) permits the continuation of an existing noncon-
forming use of a building provided that no structural alterations are made.3
Thus, since appellant's business is a nonconforming use, his permit should
have been refused unless the proposed addition was a continuation of the
land use and neither a structural alteration nor a new building. The
Pennsylvania Supreme Court has interpreted nonconforming land use pro-
visions similar to article V, section l(a) as permitting the expansion of
an existing nonconforming use over the entire tract occupied at the time
of the passage of the zoning ordinance if necessary to meet the require-
ments of normal growth of the business.4  An excavating business was
allowed to extend its operations in depth and area; 5 and the intensified
utilization of a tract of land by the installation of additional underground
storage tanks was similarly permitted.6 A structural alteration in a non-
conforming building, on the other hand, as prohibited by article V, sec-
tion 1(b), is defined as the change of an old building in such a way as to
convert it into a new or substantially different structure.7
The cases permitting expansion of an existing nonconforming land
use 8 authorize appellant to do a greater volume of business on the land
area used at the time of the passage of the ordinance and to expand his
business over his entire tract of land. But neither the cases nor the
language of section 1(a) purport to determine whether he can enlarge
except in conformity with the regulations herein established for the district in
which such land, building or structure is located.
. . . Article V . . . Section 1. (a) The lawful use of land existing at
the time of the adoption of this ordinance, although such use does not conform
to the provisions hereof, may be continued. . . .
(b) The lawful use of a building, existing at the time of the adoption of this
ordinance may be continued, although such use does not conform to the pro-
visions hereof, and such use may be extended throughout the building, provided
no structural alterations are made other than those ordered . . . to assure
the safety of the building or structure. .... "
Ordinance No. 411, Borough of Beaver, Pa. (1951), as quoted in In re: Appeal of
Peirce, 15 Beaver County L.J. 186, 190-91 (Beaver County, Pa. C.P. 1953).
3. Alterations are permitted for reasons not relevant to this case. See note 2
mipra.
4. Humphreys v. Stuart Realty Corp., 364 Pa. 616, 73 A.2d 407 (1950);
Borough of Cheswick v. Bechman, 352 Pa. 79, 42 A.2d 60 (1945) ; Gilfillan's Permit,
291 Pa. 358, 362, 140 At. 136, 138 (1927).
5. Borough of Cheswick v. Bechman, supra note 4.
6. Humphreys v. Stuart Realty Corp., 364 Pa. 616, 73 A.2d 407 (1950).
7. Selligman v. Von Allmen Bros., Inc., 297 Ky. 121, 125, 179 S.W.2d 207, 209
(1944) (replacing wooden walls with brick ones is a structural alteration) and cases
cited therein; Paye v. City of Grosse Pointe, 279 Mich. 254, 257-59, 271 N.W. 826,
827-28 (1937) (replacing building front is not a structural alteration); 1 YoKLEY,
ZONING LAW AND PRACTICE § 155 (2d ed. 1953).
8. See cases cited in note 4 supra.
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his business by erecting an additional building? This was recognized in
Humphreys v. Stuart Realty Corp.,- where the Pennsylvania court noted
that ". . . permissible enlargement of the use does not warrant the
erection of new buildings or structures or any additions to build-
ings. .... -1o Furthermore, section l(a) permits only the continued
use of land; it would seem that appellant's business involves the same use
of land "1 whether or not it is conducted within a building. Thus, while
section l(a) does not prohibit the proposed addition, neither does it
authorize it. At the same time, section 1 (b) appears to forbid the addi-
tion. The instant court stated that the section 1(b) prohibition on struc-
tural alterations had no bearing on this case since the only change in the
existing building would be the removal of the wall on the side abutting
the new building.'2 The distinction between constructing a new wing,
which presumably would be a structural alteration, and erecting a new
building and then connecting it to the old one seems insignificant. judged
by the definition of structural alteration given above,'8 the proposed addi-
tion would seem to qualify as such. But it makes no difference whether
the proposed addition is a structural alteration or a new building, as both
are expressly prohibited by the ordinance, the former by article V, sec-
tion 1(b) and the latter by article III, section 2(2).14 Thus, appellant's
permit should have been refused.
By determining that the proposed addition is a permissible extension
of an existing land use the instant court has denied force to article V, sec-
tion 1 (b). Since the policy behind the prohibition of structural alterations
is to prevent one from indefinitely prolonging the life of a nonconforming
building,15 the spirit as well as the letter of section 1 (b) argues against
the instant court's result. But although the granting of appellant's permit
under article V seems improper, he may nevertheless be entitled to a
building permit. The zoning ordinance provides for the issuance of
variances where a literal enforcement of the provisions of the ordinance
will result in unnecessary hardship and where there will be no detriment to
9. Cf. Butler v. Louisville & Jefferson County Bd. of Zoning Adjustment &
Appeals, 311 Ky. 663, 224 S.W.2d 658 (1949) (enlargement of building for a non-
conforming use permitted since ordinance prohibiting structural alterations had been
repealed).
10. 364 Pa. 616, 621, 73 A.2d 407, 409 (1950). This case was cited by the instant
court, instant case at 105, 119 A.2d at 511, only for the proposition in the text at note
4 supra.
11. For discussion of the term "use of land," see Note, Nonconforming Uses: A
Rationale and an Approach, 102 U. PA. L. Rxv. 91, 94-97 (1953).
12. Instant case at 107, 119 A.2d at 510.
13. See text at note 7 supra.
14. See note 2 supra.
15. Selligman v. Von Allmen Bros., Inc., 297 Ky. 121, 125-26, 179 S.W.2d 207,
209 (1944); 1 YOKLEY, ZONING LAW AND PRAcTIcE 377, 380 (2d ed. 1953); Note,
Elimination of Nonconforming Uses, 35 VA. L. REv. 348, 352 & n.33 (1949); see
Note, Nonconforming Uses: A Rationale and an Approach, 102 U. PA. L. REv. 91,
97-100 (1953) ; cf. Rehfeld v. San Francisco, 218 Cal. 83, 84, 21 P.2d 419, 420 (1933).
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the public interest.16 By its result the instant court has, in effect, granted
a variance, but without requiring appellant to satisfy the requirements
necessary to obtain one.
17
16. Ordinance No. 411, art VIII, § H, Borough of Beaver, Pa. (1951), quoted
in In re: Appeal of Peirce, 15 Beaver County L.J. 186, 192 (Beaver County, Pa.,
C.P. 1953). For the type of hardship required, see Note, Zoning Variances and
Exceptions: The Philadelphia Experience, 103 U. PA. L. REv. 516, 520-23 (1955).
17. See Blanarik Appeal, 375 Pa. 209, 100 A.2d 58 (1953) (variance granted on
facts similar to those in instant case). But cf. Note, Elimination of Nonconforming
Uses, 35 VA. L. REv. 348, 353 (1949).
